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Opening the Floodgates-Deliberate
Indifference, Causation and Control as Means
of Authorizing Unlimited Litigation
Under Title IX:
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the many tragedies sweeping through schools across
the United States, focus has turned even more acutely to the regulation
of student conduct toward other students-in the classrooms, on the
playgrounds, and in any setting that can be arguably linked to an educa-
tional institution. So too, the mania engulfing discourse on sexual polit-
ics was sure to collide with educational concerns, particularly where the
primary actors involved are those undergoing the protracted and often
painful phase of establishing sexual identity. In so examining regulation
of education vis-A-vis sexual politics across all realms of society from a
purely legal perspective, one may find herself mired in purely paternalis-
tic protectionist semantics, in constitutional preservationist dialogue or
somewhere on that long stretch of road constituting the continuum in
between. The art is finding the proper position in which to place the flag
of compromise-a quest which frequently plagues members of bench and
bar, as well as parents, educators and administrators nationwide. The
Supreme Court has made yet another attempt at establishing a middle
ground in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,' undoubtedly
the most recent chapter written in the realm of public school regulation
of sexual politics.
In Davis, petitioner, acting on behalf of fifth grader LaShonda
Davis, brought an action for damages against the Monroe County Board
of Education alleging exclusion from educational programs and/or activ-
ities in violation of Title IX. Among the allegations levied by Davis
were claims of pervasive, persistent, lewd and sexually explicit advances
made by a fellow student, including "[touching her] breasts and genital
area and [making] vulgar statements," over a five-month period.2 The
case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Eleventh Circuit
1. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
2. Id. at 633. The offensive student's behavior began in December, when the classmate,
referred to as G.F., touched the petitioner's breasts and genital area and made lewd and offensive
comments. Id. In February, during physical education class, the offending student placed a door
stop in his pants and began to act in a sexually provocative manner. Petitioner reported the
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which dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted.3 Faced with the task of articulating the
bounds of the damage liability of recipients of federal educational fund-
ing for actions taken by students, the Court applied and further refined a
test articulated in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.4
Specifically, the Supreme Court held:
[A] private damages action may lie against the school board in cases
of student-on-student harassment ... only where the funding recipi-
ent acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in
its programs or activities. Moreover .... such an action will lie only
for harassment that is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive
that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportu-
nity or benefit.5
This Note rejects the Court's application of the deliberate indifference,
causation and control standard as applied to student-on-student sexual
harassment claims. Furthermore, this Note argues that the application of
control principles, in conjunction with its causal requirements, falls short
of harmonizing the delicate interests involved in classroom sexual har-
assment cases and runs awry of the policies underlying Title IX. Part II
of this Note examines the evolution of the Davis test by looking at the
principle cases establishing private rights of action under Title IX, as
well as the Davis decision itself. Part III breaks down the Davis test,
analyzing its underpinnings and articulating the impracticabilities inher-
ent in the Davis test, and those that are likely to follow in subsequent
cases. The deliberate indifference, control and causation elements of the
test run contrary to Title IX and to the scope of implied private rights of
action cases establishing Davis's claim. Part IV examines the compet-
ing interests in Davis, urges a narrowing of the broad conferral of reme-
dial power now available against recipients of federal education funding,
and suggests replacing the deliberate indifference and control elements
of the Davis test with an intent requirement, as mandated by the terms of
Title IX.
student's conduct to her physical education teacher. Allegedly, this and similar behavior
continued until mid-May, when G.F. plead guilty to charges of sexual battery. Id. at 634.
3. Id. at 636-37.
4. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). In Gebser, a student brought suit against several parties, including
the school board, alleging exclusion from educational opportunities after she was engaged in a
sexual relationship with her teacher. See infra Part II.B.
5. Davis, 526 U.S. at 632.
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II. A CLOSER LOOK AT DAVIS
A. The Origins of Damages Actions Under Title IX:
Cannon v. University of Chicago to Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools
The Supreme Court first authorized a private right of action for
exclusion from educational opportunities or activities under Title IX in
Cannon v. University of Chicago.6 In Cannon, the Court applied the
four-part Cort v. Ash test and held that petitioner could state a private
cause of action under Title IX.7 Specifically, the Court held that the
petitioner, a student who was allegedly refused entrance into medical
school because of her gender, was an intended beneficiary of Title IX,
that the legislative scheme was not frustrated by permitting a private
cause of action, and that the cause of action would neither frustrate nor
impede the underlying foundation of Title IX or the relevant state inter-
ests.8 The Court noted, however, that these suits were neither frequent
nor costly and thus did not constitute an excessive burden upon funding
6. Id. at 639 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
7. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689-709 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (holding that the test
in determining whether a private cause of action is appropriate for a violation of a statutorily
imposed right where Congress is silent, is (1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a
special class of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) whether there is any indication of intent on
behalf of the legislature to create a private remedy, (3) whether creation of such a remedy is
consistent with the purpose underlying the statutory scheme, and (4) whether the subject matter
involves an area of such concern to the States that implying a federal remedy would be
inappropriate)).
8. Id. In examining the legislative history of Title IX to determine the second element of the
Cort test, i.e., whether the legislature intended to create a private federal remedy, the Cannon
Court used Title VI as a paradigm to create a private cause of action under Title IX. Such a result
was possible because the literal language of Title IX mirrors that of Title VI. Specifically, the
Court stated that Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Except for
the substitution of the word "sex" in Title IX to replace the words "race, color, or national origin"
in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the benefited class. Both statutes
provide the same administrative mechanism for terminating federal financial support for
institutions engaged in prohibited discrimination. Neither statute expressly mentions a private
remedy for the person excluded from participation in a federally funded program. The drafters of
Title IX explicitly assumed that Title IX would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been in
the preceding eight years. Id. at 694. Accordingly, when Title IX was enacted in 1972, the Court
looked to the state of Title VI private rights of action to infer legislative intent as to private causes
of action under Title IX. Finding that courts had permitted private actions alleging infringement
of federal statutory rights, the Court reasoned that the same result was required under Title IX. Id.
at 696 (stating that "[w]hen Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already
been construed as creating a private remedy"). Specifically, the Fifth Circuit, as well as a dozen
other federal courts after the enactment of Title IX, had inferred private rights of action under
Title VI. Id. However, an indication of congressional intent not to attach liability to school
boards (i.e., the funding recipients) is Congress' failure to amend Title VII in 1991 to so provide.
Although this premise would also militate against the recognition of implied rights of action
almost entirely, the issue of private damages actions brought under Title IX is outside the scope of
this Note.
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recipients.9 When the Cannon decision was handed down in 1979, the
Court had not yet recognized sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination.
From Cannon came Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,1"
in which the Court permitted money damages for Title IX violations. In
Franklin, however, the action for damages arose in the context of
alleged intentional harassment by a school educator.'"
The Franklin Court held that "a damages remedy is available for an
action brought to enforce Title IX."'1 2 In establishing the right to mone-
tary relief for violations of rights conferred upon students under Title IX,
the Court relied upon several propositions, stating that, "[w]here legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-
edy to make good the wrong done."' 3 Moreover, the Court maintained
9. Id. It should also be noted that the Court relied upon the infrequency of suit and,
accordingly, the diminished threat to the fiscal health of educational institutions covered under
Title IX, in allowing an implied private right of action. The Court inferred that no evidence
existed to show that cases under Title IX or Title VI would be so costly or voluminous so as to
disrupt the educational institution. The Court stated that "[w]hatever disruption of the academic
community may accompany an occasional individual suit seeking admission is dwarfed by the
relief expressly contemplated by the statute-a cutoff of all federal funds." Id. at 710 n.44.
Interestingly, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Davis, the petitioner in Davis sought
damages of $500,000, yet, the total amount of federal funding received by the Monroe County
Board of Education under Title IX was only $679,000. Davis, 526 U.S. at 681 (citing Brief for the
School Amici 25 n.20). Furthermore, in 1993, the American Association of University Women
Educational Foundation found that four out of every five women have been subjected to some
form of sexual harassment during their educational tenure. HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 7 (1993) [hereinafter "HOSTILE
HALLWAYS"].
10. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
11. In Franklin, petitioner alleged that she was continually sexually harassed by an employee
of the Gwinnett County Public Schools; as a result, petitioner was effectively denied equal access
to educational opportunities and benefits in violation of Title IX. Petitioner claimed that,
beginning in the fall of her sophomore year of high school, Andrew Hill, a sports coach and
teacher employed by the school district, engaged her repeatedly in sexual discourse, which
included asking her specific questions regarding her sexual experiences with her boyfriend, and
questions regarding her willingness to have sexual intercourse with an older man. Id. at 63.
Petitioner alleged that Hill kissed her forcibly on the mouth while on school property, telephoned
her home and urged Petitioner to meet him. Petitioner also alleged that during her junior year of
high school, Hill excused Petitioner from class a number of times, took her to an office on school
property and coerced her into engaging in sexual intercourse. Id. Finally, petitioner alleged that
the teachers and administrators of Gwinnet County, although aware of the petitioner's claims of
sexual harassment by Hill and claims of sexual harassment made by other female students, took
no action to stop the harassment, and discouraged petitioner from pursuing legal action against
Hill. Id. at 64. On April 14, 1988, Hill resigned on the condition that the school cease all
investigation of him and his conduct. Id.
12. Id. at 76.
13. Id. at 66 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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that a private remedy was required by common law.' 4 The Court also
relied upon non-Title IX cases as support for the proposition that mone-
tary damages were an appropriate remedy for an intentional violation of
federal statute.1 5
The Franklin Court was also confronted with claims that "the nor-
mal presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies should not apply
because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause
Power. 16 In response, the Court cited Pennhurst State School and Hos-
pital v. Halderman,"7 and held that money damages are available in
actions brought under federal statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause when the violation is intentional, due to the contractual nature of
Spending Clause; monetary damages are not permitted for unintentional
violations because "the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that
it will be liable."' 8
The most recent whittling of the doctrine of private damages
actions under Title IX came in 1998 when the Court decided Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District.9
B. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
Once again, the Court had to address the question of whether a
school board could be held liable for sexual harassment of a student by a
14. In addition, the Franklin Court pointed to the age-old legal principle that it is the province
and domain of the judiciary to provide remedy for an infringement of a right. Id. at 66. Citing
Blackstone, and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the Court seemed to equate the right of
redress to one of monetary relief. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66. 'This principle originated in the
English common law, and Blackstone described it is 'a general and indisputable rule that, where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at .law, whenever that right is
invaded."' Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66-67 (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 23 (1783)). See
also Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 19, 21, 87 Eng. Rep. 808, 816 (Q.B. 1702) ("If a statute gives a right,
the common law will give a remedy to maintain that right.").
15. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70 (citing Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York
City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) and Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984)).
16. Id. at 74.
17. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Pennhurst, a mentally disabled patient brought an action against
Pennhurst, a state-owned and operated institution alleging, inter alia violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 6010. Id. at 6. Pennhurst claimed the patient could not maintain a private cause of action under
the Rehabilitation Act because Congress did not specifically establish such an action under the
Act. Id. at 10. The Court held that remedies are limited under statutes enacted pursuant to the
Spending Clause when the alleged violation is unintentional. Id. at 28-29. According to the
Court, "Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."
Therefore, an entity receiving federal funds must have notice that it will be liable for damages for
such a violation. Id. at 17.
18. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74. ("The point of not permitting monetary damages for an
unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable
for a monetary award.")
19. 524 U.S. 274 (1989).
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teacher. In Gebser, a ninth grade student was allegedly induced into a
sexual relationship with her teacher.2" Neither the school nor the school
board had promulgated, advertised, established or articulated a policy or
grievance procedure against sexual harassment. Apparently, no one was
privy to the actions taken by the teacher despite evidence of repeated
inappropriate sexual comments and innuendoes made by the allegedly
harassing teacher both during and outside of class, as well as complaints
about the teacher lodged by the parents of two other students."1
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, rejecting
Gebser's Title IX claim. The district court reasoned that Title IX "was
enacted to counter policies of discrimination . . . in federally funded
education programs and that only if school administrators have some
type of notice of the gender discrimination and fail to respond in good
faith can the discrimination be interpreted as a policy of the school dis-
trict."22 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.23
In affirming the ruling of the lower courts, Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the majority, opined that Gebser failed to state an action for dam-
ages for discrimination under Title IX.24 Specifically, the Court held
that:
damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who, at
a minimum, has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf, has actual
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails to
adequately respond .... We think, moreover, that the response must
amount to deliberate indifferent to discrimination.25
The Gebser Court premised its actual knowledge/deliberate indif-
ference standard on considerations of contractual notice requirements
20. Petitioner alleged that, as an eighth-grade student, she entered a book discussion class
headed by teacher Frank Waldrop. Id. at 277. Petitioner claims that Waldrop made sexually
explicit comments and suggestions to the students. Id. Subsequently, petitioner was enrolled in
several high school classes taught by Waldrop, throughout which Waldrop continued to make
sexually explicit comments, many of which he directed specifically at petitioner. Id. at 278.
Allegedly, Waldrop visited petitioner at her home, kissed and fondled her, and thereafter initiated
sexual intercourse. Id. The sexual relationship continued for roughly one year. Although the
relationship was not reported to school officials, parents of other students complained to the
school's principal. The principal met with Waldrop to discuss the complaints, and warned
Waldrop to maintain proper conduct and refrain from making any sexually explicit comments. Id.
Waldrop was later fired after he was arrested when he and petitioner were discovered engaged in
sexual intercourse by a police officer. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 279 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a-7a).
23. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).
24. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
25. Id.
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due to Title IX's enactment under the Spending Clause,26 and applica-
tion of principles underlying Title IX's express means of enforcement. 27
Furthermore, the Court rejected the application of agency principles,
holding that the conduct of the teacher should not be deemed the con-
duct of the funding recipient.28 As the funding recipient was held to
have been neither aware of nor deliberately indifferent to the harass-
ment, Gebser was unable to recover.29
The Court in Gebser laid the foundation for the "actual knowledge/
deliberate indifference" standard yet fell short of fully articulating the
parameters of the "deliberate indifference" element of the Title IX test.30
This omission led inevitably to Davis.
C. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
1. THE DAVIS DILEMMA: STUDENT-STUDENT HARASSMENT AS A
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX
In Davis, petitioner, acting on behalf of her daughter, LaShonda
Davis, a fifth grader, brought an action for damages against the Monroe
County Board of Education alleging that her daughter was excluded
from educational programs and activities in violation of Title IX.31
Davis claimed she was subjected to pervasive and persistent sexually
explicit acts taken by a fellow student, including his "[touching her]
breasts and genital area and [making] vulgar statements. 32 This and
similar conduct lasted for five months, during which Davis and her
mother made repeated complaints to a number of teachers and to the
school's principal.33 Petitioner also produced evidence of the teachers'
26. Id. at 287.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 provides:
in pertinent part, Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section
may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been
an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to
comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to
the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or
part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, that no such action shall be taken
until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1682 (West 2000).
28. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283, 285.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 290.
31. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
32. Id. at 633.
33. Id. at 635.
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and the principal's utter failure to respond to these complaints.34
The Federal Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed
Davis's complaint, holding that student-on-student sexual harassment
does not constitute a viable cause of action under Title IX,35 and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.37
2. THE DAVIS TEST
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor,38 the Court held that,
"student-on-student sexual harassment [is] capable of triggering a dam-
ages claim [if it] involve(s) the overt, physical deprivation of access to
school resources. 39
Broken into its constituent elements, this test-the Court's apparent
response to the impending unlimitable reach of harassment law-
presents a number of questions that must be resolved in order to deter-
mine whether a claimant has properly stated a claim for exclusion from
an educational program or activity under Title IX. According to the spe-
cific, explicit and literal terms of the Davis test, one must examine (1)
whether the funding recipient exercised control over the harasser, (2)
whether the harassing behavior impeded the educational opportunities of
the victim/harassee,4 ° (3) whether the funding recipient possessed actual
knowledge of the harassment,4 and (4) whether the recipient displayed
34. Id.
35. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F.Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
36. A panel for the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's
dismissal of Petitioner's complaint. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 74 F.3d 1186,
1195 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that as Title VII encompasses a claim for damages due to a
sexually hostile working environment created by co-workers and tolerated by the employer, and
therefore, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow student or students when the supervising authorities knowingly
fail to act to eliminate the harassment).
The Eleventh Circuit granted the Monroe County Board of Education's motion for rehearing
en banc and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Davis's complaint on the basis that, as Title
IX was passed under the Spending Clause, notice to the funding recipient must be clear and
unambiguous. Davis, 120 F.3d 1390 at 1392.
37. Davis, 526 U.S. at 637.
38. It should be noted that the Gebser decision, holding that a student allegedly harassed by
her teacher did not state a cause of action for damages under Title IX, was also written by Justice
O'Connor.
39. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
40. Put another way, whether the behavior was "so severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit." Id.
at 633.
41. The actual knowledge element of the Davis test arises from the enactment of Title IX as
under the Spending Clause. The Court states that:
private damages actions are available only where recipients of federal funding had
adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at issue ... [T]here can, of
course, be no knowing acceptance of the terms of the putative contract if a state is
[Vol. 55:147
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deliberate indifference to the actions of the harasser.42 This formulation,
however, on its face runs contrary to the literal language, as well as
legislative history, of Title IX.
III. BORN IN A BARN: THE DAVIS TEST AS AN OPEN INVITATION TO
PERPETUAL LITIGATION OF TITLE IX HARASSMENT SUITS
A. Deliberate Indifference
According to the Court, the Davis test mandates that liability attach
only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.43 The inclusion
of a deliberate indifference standard is an attempt by the Court to satisfy
the Title IX requirement that, in order for liability to attach, the action of
the funding recipient must be the cause of the exclusion; in essence, it is
the deliberate indifference that is the cause of the exclusion.
The Court's holding, however, erects no fences indicating the limits
on school board liability, i.e., what does and does not constitute "delib-
erate indifference"? The Monroe County Board of Education met with
the allegedly offending student, but only after prolonged requests. It
changed the classroom seating structure, but only following repeated
demands. While these actions may on their face appear patently insuffi-
cient, the Court fails to articulate the Board's specific error(s). Did the
school board wait too long? Would the identical actions still constitute
deliberate indifference if taken following the third request instead of the
sixth? Are these actions in and of themselves insufficient to clear the
bar of indifference into the land of acceptable (non-liability) reaction?
The illustrations that may or may not give rise to Title IX liability under
the deliberate indifference element of the Davis test are almost infinite.
Thus, deliberate indifference utterly fails as a quantitative yardstick by
which to gauge the legality of funding recipients' responses to known
acts of harassment.
unaware of the conditions imposed by the legislation or is unable to ascertain what
is expected of it.
Id. at 640 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
As the Court held in Pennhurst, as federal funding takes the form of a contract between the
funding recipient and the federal government. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28. Accordingly, a funding
recipient must have notice of the potential liability in order to been deemed to have consented to
the requirement. Id. at 17. The Court stated that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions." id. at 17. Contention of the actual notice requirement as
applied by the Court in Davis is, as it is consistent with traditional notions embedded in contract
law, outside the scope of this Note.
42. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
43. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
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B. Causation
Title IX specifically states that "[n]o person on the basis of sex
shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance."'  In essence, the statute says the
exclusion must be caused by the funding recipient. Yet, the Court's test
blurs the element of causation, seemingly requiring two separate and
distinct actors to cause a student's exclusion from an educational activity
or program.
First, the Davis test as stated requires that the behavior of the har-
asser cause the exclusion. Specifically, the Court held that the conduct
of the harasser must be "so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive
that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity
or benefit."45 Citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,46 the Davis Court
stated that physical exclusion was not necessary to show deprivation of
an educational opportunity. Specifically, the Court stated that:
[i]t is not necessary, however, to show physical exclusion to demon-
strate that students have been deprived by the actions of another stu-
dent or students of an educational opportunity on the basis of sex.
Rather, a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so under-
mines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the
victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's
resources and opportunities. 47
However, the Meritor48 test for identifying "hostile environment"
sexual harassment, while supplying an established and much used quali-
tative framework, cannot be harmonized in conjunction with the Court's
additional causal requirement placed upon the funding recipient absent
application of agency principles, a prospect which the Court emphati-
cally rejects.
Conversely, the Court ardently insists that, as a result of its holding,
liability may be incurred by the Monroe County Board of Education but
could only be so incurred as a result of the Board's inaction rather than
the action of the harasser. It is not disputed that in order for liability to
attach under Title IX, the discrimination must occur "under [an] educa-
tional program or activity." 49
Yet, without applying agency principles, which would substantiate
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added).
45. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
46. Mertor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
47. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
48. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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the imputation of the agent's actions to the principal, one is left with the
propositions that: (1) the offending student must cause the harassment,
and (2) the funding recipient must act with deliberate indifference. This
"double-causation requirement" runs contrary to the requirements of
Title IX.
Moreover, the Court's analytical framework, under which the har-
asser's behavior must be examined to determine whether the behavior
caused the discrimination, was derived almost verbatim from hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII. 5° Under
Title VII, a single instance of harassment may be so severe as to consti-
tute a hostile work environment. Taken to its logical conclusion, this
double-causation requirement demands that the funding recipient be held
liable if a single instance of harassment was so severe and objectively
offensive so as to cause exclusion. Yet, the Court vehemently asserts an
opposite conclusion. Specifically, the Court states that:
[a]lthough, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-
one peer harassment could be said to have [the effect of denying a
victim equal access], we think it unlikely that Congress would have
thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the
inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that
would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifferences to a
single instance of one-on-one peer harassment.51
Although the Court exercised the foresight to perceive the inunda-
tion of litigation sure to emanate from its holding when applied to a
single sufficiently severe act of harassment, many other scenarios may
yield the same or similar results. What if there were two severe inci-
dents? On this, and other similar questions, the Court remains silent, but
its holding speaks volumes, and will almost surely lead to volumes more
in future court pleadings.
C. Control
The Court further requires that the funding recipient exercise con-
trol over the harasser. The Court states that:
[t]he statute's plain language confines the scope of prohibited con-
duct based on the recipient's degree of control over the harasser and
the environment in which the harassment occurs . . . a recipient's
damages liability is limited to circumstances wherein the recipient
exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in
which the harassment occurs.52
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
51. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53.
52. Id. at 644-45 (emphasis added).
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This element fails to establish perimeters outlining the boundaries
of a recipient's liability, thus failing to create a practicable guideline for
funding recipients not only when responding to complaints lodged by
students and/or their representatives, but also in monitoring the conduct
of students on a daily basis53 in any number of educational settings that
may arguably be deemed "under" the recipient's programs.54
Further, the Court's assertion that "the petitioner attempts to hold
the Board liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known
student-on-student harassment in its schools,"55 rather than holding the
school board liable for the actions of the harasser, renders control over
the individual and the environment in which the harassment occurs
superfluous. Arguably, a decision not to act by a funding recipient was
a decision made by and in regard to an educational program or activity
and therefore is "under" that program or activity.56 The control element
of the Davis test creates greater uncertainty around a test already mired
in ambiguity.
IV. FINDING DIRECTION: A LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF DAVIS
A. Establishing a Roadmap: Policy Concerns Underlying Davis
In an attempt to bring order to the chaos of recipient liability under
Title IX, credence must be lent to the underlying policy considerations
that permeate Title IX.
Classroom harassment throws into the fray another set of concerns
that almost wholly alter the margins of debate and call for more careful
analysis. One primary concern is the interest in preserving the auton-
omy of school administrators to effectively educate our nation's youth.
This concern, implicated in Davis, can be narrowed into a number of
distinct categories, each a star directing the ship of compromise to the
most equitable and efficient harbor. First, the underlying impetus of
53. Under the Davis test it is unclear whether failing to provide adequate mechanisms for
detecting harassment would lead to liability. Under the clear terms of the test, the recipient must
have actual knowledge. Id. at 633. Furthermore, the school board in Gebser failed to institute a
mechanism for detecting and processing complaints of sexual harassment, yet escaped liability on
the ground of lack of knowledge. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91.
54. For example, a school-sponsored football game on school grounds would be an example
of an environment over which a school board exercises control, but an arena wherein exercising
control is in practice difficult, imposes an onerous burden upon funding recipients.
55. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641.
56. It should be noted and remembered that the Davis test applies to all educational
institutions covered by Title IX, thus including public collegiate institutions receiving federal
funding assistance. The parameters of control in collegiate settings are almost impossible to
define, and a great chasm exists between the actual and intended spheres of control. For example,
college dormitories are surely areas over which the funding recipient should exercise control, but
control mechanisms may be impracticalities in certain circumstances.
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Title IX is to protect each child's right to equal access to educational
benefits and opportunities." Second, Title IX seeks to maintain the fis-
cal health of schools in order to provide the most effective and efficient
educational opportunities to the greatest number of children. Third, it
provides reasonable regulations that avoid infringement upon the right
of free speech enjoyed by students, teachers and administrators. Fourth,
it preserves the ideals of federalism and the severance of the separate
and distinct realms of federal and state authority. Finally, it upholds the
demands of a tri-parte government system.58 A rule governing the regu-
lation of student interaction should take into account each of these poli-
cies, yet should keep in mind that such a rule is not to be enforced in a
vacuum. A number of substantive and procedural safeguards that gov-
ern nearly all facets of America's educational system already exist.59
The Court claims that the principles underlying the enactment of
Title IX demand application of the Davis test. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the rationale may have developed along with the case law.
According to Senator Evan Bayh, Title IX was intended to be pervasive.
"It is clear to me that sex discrimination reaches into all facets of educa-
tion-admission, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and promotion,
professional staffing and pay scales."6 Yet, the discrimination in Davis
deals with none of these, but, rather, with constructive deprivations
induced by alteration of the educational environment because of sexual
harassment. To be sure, at the time Title IX was enacted, the Court had
yet to recognize a cause of action for sex discrimination based upon
hostile environment even in cases arising under Title VII, under which
remedies and recoveries have been deemed far broader than those under
Title X.61
57. 118 Cong. Rec. 5802, 5803 (1972).
58. Courts have become exceedingly accustomed to the force of judicial policymaking under
the auspice of implied rights of action. When the rights and responsibilities of our nation's
educational system hang in the balance, congressional decrees should be more strictly construed
and policymaking should be on its shortest leash.
59. A failure to permit a private damages action against funding recipients under Title IX
would not altogether preclude a harassed student from having his day in court or from recovery, as
there remain many available and open avenues, such as actions under state tort laws.
60. 118 Cong. Rec. 5802, 5803 (1972).
61. It was not until 1986, in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, that the Court held that "[flor sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 58 (quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (15th Cir. 1971)). Moreover, it was not until 1991 that
Congress amended Title VII to permit private rights of action for damages; Title VII was urged by
the Court in Gebser as a wide reaching statute in regard to which Congress intended greater and
far broader remedial measures be available than under Title IX. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283.
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B. The Next Step: A Return to Title IX Principles
Reconsideration is necessary to eliminate the confusion and lessen
the influx of litigation likely to result from the irregular boundaries
established by the Davis test. The deliberate indifference and control
elements of the Davis test are each fabricated from shards of statutory
principle in an attempt by the Court to fashion a remedial scheme that
would provide redress for students denied equal opportunity to educa-
tional programs or activities covered under Title IX. A return to the
principles articulated and demanded by the text of Title IX, as
expounded upon in Pennhurst,62 would be more appropriate to harmo-
nize the competing interests underlying student-on-student sexual har-
assment claims under Title IX.63 Pennhurst demonstrates the proper
inquiry to examine private rights of action arising under statutes enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause. Specifically, to maintain an action, a
plaintiff must show that the actions of the funding recipient intentionally
caused the exclusion. This represents the minimum standard required
by the literal language underlying Title IX and the corresponding under-
lying congressional intent. Put another way, for liability to attach to a
funding recipient for exclusion of a student from an educational opportu-
nity or benefit, the recipient must have intended the exclusion.
The Cannon Court, which predicated its holding upon the fact that
litigation is neither so costly nor voluminous so as to impugn the legisla-
tive scheme, recognized the potential effect that costly and multitudi-
nous litigation would have on a school district's financial well-being.
The Court inferred that no evidence existed to show that cases under
Title IX or Title VII would be either so costly or voluminous as to dis-
rupt the educational institution.'
In Davis, however, petitioner sought damages of $500,000 although
the total amount of federal funding received by the district was only
$679,000.65 Further, studies have found that four out of every five
women claim to have been subjected to some form of sexual harassment
throughout their educational career.6 6 So, with the changing times must
come changing rules.
62. See infra Part A.
63. The Court in Pennhurst held that remedies are limited under statutes enacted pursuant to
the Spending Clause when the alleged violation is unintentional. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
64. The Court stated that "[w]hatever disruption of the academic community may accompany
an occasional individual suit seeking admission is dwarfed by the relief expressly contemplated by
the statute-a cutoff of all federal funds." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 710 n.44.
65. Davis, 526 U.S. at 681 (citing Brief for the School Amici 25 n.20).
66. HoSnLE HALLWAYS, supra, note 9, at 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Davis riddles even larger and more hazard-
ous holes in the fabric of the American educational system and threatens
even more perilously the constitutional demarcation of state and federal
authority. The Davis test transcends the limitations fixed by Congress in
enacting Title IX, and considerations of federalism and separation of
powers. From a well of restrictive covenants, the Court ladles a reme-
dial structure which provides almost unlimitable monetary relief, in stark
contrast to the remedial structure established by Congress in Title IX.
The proper standard to be applied in cases alleging exclusion from
educational opportunities or benefits because of a student's sexual har-
assment of another student is one that restricts damages actions under
Title IX to those instances where the recipient has intended, and thus
caused, the exclusion. The Court's holding in Pennhurst67 demands the
infusion of an intent requirement, as does the text and underlying poli-
cies of Title IX. Such an infusion will not foreclose altogether a right of
redress for students who were denied an educational opportunity or ben-
efit under a program or activity covered by Title IX.
As noted by the Court in Cannon in 1979, such suits were not so
frequent or costly as to jeopardize the fiscal health of educational institu-
tions.68 Although perhaps the case at the time of Cannon, today, failing
to provide monetary damages for abuses suffered in society seems
almost un-American given the over-litigiousness of contemporary soci-
ety. The educational arena is no exception to the rule that the first reac-
tion to every action is in a court of law. The Court's rule in Davis has
followed the modem trend. Thus, a return to the principles demanded
under Cannon and Title IX should be the first step toward arresting the
catastrophic effect that limitless litigation and boundless liability would
have on America's educational institutions, as well as the multitude of
federal programs and activities that can arguably be deemed Spending
Clause legislation, for "the interpretive method we sow today for one
provision might be reaped by us tomorrow for another."69
MELISSA M. SOLOCINSKI
67. See supra note 17.
68. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709.
69. Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 831, 840
(1998).
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